EconoMonitor

Nouriel Roubini's Global EconoMonitor

Credit Derivatives, Hedge Funds and Leverage Ratios of 50: The Credit House of Cards

Gillian Tett, the sharp Financial Times editor who covers derivative instruments, structured finance and the explosion of credit in financial markets, reports on a senior banker telling her how leverage ratios of 50 or more are currently easily reached in financial markets:

“He then relates the case of a typical hedge fund, two times levered. That looks modest until you realise it is partly backed by fund of funds’ money (which is three times levered) and investing in deeply subordinated tranches of collateralised debt obligations, which are nine times levered. “Thus every €1m of CDO bonds [acquired] is effectively supported by less than €20,000 of end investors’ capital – a 2% price decline in the CDO paper wipes out the capital supporting it. “

Just to clarify this credit pyramid that looks like a Ponzi Game: you start with 20,000 euros invested by some investors into a hedge funds of funds; this is all equity. Then, this fund of funds borrows - at a leverage ratio of three - and invests the initial capital and the borrowed funds into an hedge fund. Then this hedge fund takes this fund of funds investment and borrows – at a leverage ratio of two - and invests the raised capital and the borrowed funds into a deeply subordinated tranches of Collateralized Debt Obbligations (that are themselves highly levered instruments with a leverage ratio of nine). So the final investment of 1 million has behind it 20,000 of equity capital and 980,000 of debt. So, if the value/price of the final investment falls by only 2% the entire capital behind it is wiped out. This is a credit house of cards where a dollar of capital is turned into 49 dollars of additional debt to finance an investment of 50. The systemic dangers/risks of this fragile credit house of cards are complicated to assess as they depend on how much of this debt/credit accumulation is concentrated or spread among many financial intermediaries. But, at face value, this kind of leverage ratios looks scary.

Here is the entire column by Gillian Tett:

The unease bubbling in today’s brave new financial world

By Gillian Tett

Published: January 19 2007 02:00 | Last updated: January 19 2007 02:00

Last week I received an e-mail that made chilling reading. The author claimed to be a senior banker with strong feelings about a column I wrote last week, suggesting that the explosion in structured finance could be exacerbating the current exuberance of the credit markets, by creating additional leverage.

“Hi Gillian,” the message went. “I have been working in the leveraged credit and distressed debt sector for 20 years . . . and I have never seen anything quite like what is currently going on. Market participants have lost all memory of what risk is and are behaving as if the so-called wall of liquidity will last indefinitely and that volatility is a thing of the past.

“I don’t think there has ever been a time in history when such a large proportion of the riskiest credit assets have been owned by such financially weak institutions . . . with very limited capacity to withstand adverse credit events and market downturns.

“I am not sure what is worse, talking to market players who generally believe that ‘this time it’s different’, or to more seasoned players who . . . privately acknowledge that there is a bubble waiting to burst but . . . hope problems will not arise until after the next bonus round.”

He then relates the case of a typical hedge fund, two times levered. That looks modest until you realise it is partly backed by fund of funds’ money (which is three times levered) and investing in deeply subordinated tranches of collateralised debt obligations, which are nine times levered. “Thus every €1m of CDO bonds [acquired] is effectively supported by less than €20,000 of end investors’ capital – a 2% price decline in the CDO paper wipes out the capital supporting it.

“The degree of leverage at work . . . is quite frankly frightening,” he concludes. “Very few hedge funds I talk to have got a prayer in the next downturn. Even more worryingly, most of them don’t even expect one.”

Since this message arrived via an anonymous e-mail account, it might be a prank. But I doubt it. For, while I would not normally write an article about responses to an article (it is the journalist’s equivalent of creating derivatives of derivatives) I am breaking this rule, since I have recently had numerous e-mails echoing the above points. And most of these come from named individuals, albeit ones who need to stay anonymous, since they work for institutions reaping profits from modern finance.

There is, for example, a credit analyst at a bulge-bracket bank who worries that rating agencies are stoking up the structured credit boom, with dangerously little oversight. “[If you] take away the three anointed interpreters of ‘investment grade’, that market folds up shop. I wonder if your readers understand that . . . and the non-trivial conflict of interest that these agencies sit on top of as publicly listed, for-profit companies?”

Then there is the (senior) asset manager who thinks leverage is proliferating because investors believe risk has been dispersed so well there will never be a crisis, though this proposition remains far from proven. “I have been involved in [these] markets since the early days,” he writes. “[But] I wonder if those who are newer to the game truly understand the impact of a down cycle?”

Another Wall Street banker fears that leverage is proliferating so fast, via new instruments, that it leaves policy officials powerless. “I hope that rational investors and asset prices cool off instead of collapse, like they did in Japan in the 1990s,” he writes. “But if they do, monetary policy will be useless.”

To be fair, amid this wave of anxiety I also received a couple of “soothing” comments. An analyst at JPMorgan, for example, kindly explained at length the benefits of the CDO boom: namely that these instruments help investors diversify portfolios; provide long-term financing for asset managers and reallocate risk.

“Longer term, there may well be a re-pricing of assets as the economy slows and credit risk increases,” he concludes. “But. there is a very strong case to be made that the CDO market has played a major role in driving down economic and market volatility over the past 10 years.” Let us hope so. And certainly investors are behaving as if volatility is disappearing: just look at yesterday’s remarkable movements in credit default swaps. But if there is any moral from my inbox, it is how much unease – and leverage – is bubbling, largely unseen, in today’s Brave New financial world. That is definitely worth shouting about, even amid the records now being set in the derivatives sector.

 

64 Responses to “Credit Derivatives, Hedge Funds and Leverage Ratios of 50: The Credit House of Cards”

WayneJanuary 20th, 2007 at 6:56 pm

John Succo, who runs a $1.5 billion hedge and contributes investment commentary to Minmyanville, mada a similar point recently:  ”The Federal Reserve creates credit through its open market operations like REPOS and coupon passes. If the Fed wants to inject liquidity (credit) into the system, they simply call up large broker dealers and buy some of their bonds with credit they create out of thin air (this expands their balance sheet). The dealer then passes this credit on to “the market” by making loans to mortgage companies or margin accounts or whatever. Because each layer of lender is only required to keep marginal capital on hand, a $1 billion REPO done by the Fed eventually creates as much as $100 billion in new credit to the consumer.  [snipping an interesting debunking of the notion that the China has excess savings]  This situation is very unstable in the long run. The Federal Reserves’ balance sheet this year alone has expanded by $30 billion in this way and created $3.5 trillion of new credit in the U.S. Public debt around the world is growing exponentially and total debt in the U.S. now stands at nearly 3.6 times GDP (1929 was 2.8 times).”  Full article: http://www.minyanville.com/gazette/bios.htm?bio=16

CPRJanuary 20th, 2007 at 7:09 pm

Nice work NR,  Now you’re talking my language: credit derivatives and financial speculation.   First, you put up that Gillian Tett FT article I linked yesterday on your previous post.   Second, you are using my favorite word: The Ponzi. Those who have read my posts know I’m using it all the time, practically my calling card.   To further add to the discussion…  Doug Noland is sharp this week. Here is a snippet of him opening up a can of analytical whup-ass on Bernake and Mishkin. the newest member of the Ponzi High Council (aka the Federal Reserve Board of Governors):   ”The Fed’s policy of responding to asset price risk disregards the reality that behind the serial asset market Bubbles have operated a Credit system and Pool of Speculative Finance that, by its very nature, inflates only larger, more powerful, and increasingly destabilizing with each passing year of accommodation. Over time, as Bubble infrastructure and psychology become more entrenched, failure to “prick” the Bubble is to further accommodate it. As we have again witnessed during the past year, there are profound consequences to the Fed’s policy of ignoring Credit excess and resulting asset Bubbles. Moreover, incorporating into policy the intention of “appropriately dealing with the consequences” of asset Bubbles openly invites the by now dominating leveraged speculating community to aggressively position to profit from prospective rate cuts and “reflations.”   I am personally a little sick and tired of the cop out nonsense that Bubbles can’t be identified until after the fact. If the focus were on Credit – where it should and must be -the analysis would become much less nebulous and the policy task much less ambiguous. When home mortgage debt growth accelerated from 1998’s 8.0% to 1999’s 9.4%, the Fed should have been on notice. When 2001’s 9.3% growth jumped to 2002’s 10.6%, they should have been on guard. When mortgage Credit then expanded 11.6% in both 2003 and 2004, there was no doubt that a problematic Bubble in Mortgage Credit had emerged, and the Fed should have aggressively tightened policy. Yet the Fed sat idly by and watched mortgage debt expanded a further 20% in two years, with resulting unprecedented Current Account Deficits, leveraged speculation, and global liquidity excess inspiriting speculative Bubbles in asset, securities and commodities markets across the globe.”  For the full article:  http://www.prudentbear.com/articles/show/295     

John RyskampJanuary 20th, 2007 at 7:23 pm

Yet the Fed sat idly by and watched mortgage debt expanded a further 20% in two years, with resulting unprecedented Current Account Deficits, leveraged speculation, and global liquidity excess inspiriting speculative Bubbles in asset, securities and commodities markets across the globe.”   ”IDLE?” THIS CONCEPT IS NOT ONLY RIDICULOUS–IT DOES A DISSERVICE TO READERS. WHAT ARE THE POWER RELATIONSHIPS WHICH RECEIVED ADVANTAGES FROM THE POLICY, AND WHICH POWER RELATIONSHIPS WERE DISADVANTAGED BY IT?  ”MORAL HAZARD” IS ANOTHER IDIOTIC TERM. IT MASKS AN IDEOLOGICAL AGENDA, AND TELLS US PRECISELY ZERO ABOUT THE FACTS INVOLVED IN ANY SUCH “MORAL HAZARD.”   TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES. WHAT ABOUT THIS STATEMENT ABOUT THEM:  IT WAS THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO MOVE SUBPRIME BORROWERS INTO OWNERSHIP AND HOUSING, BUT NOT THAT THEY REMAIN OWNERS OR IN THE HOUSING.   TRUE OR FALSE? TO ANSWER IT, YOU HAVE TO ACTUALLY LEARN THE FACTS WHICH WENT INTO THE INCREASE IN SUBPRIME MORTGAGES. YOU ACTUALLY HAVE TO INVESTIGATE–AND THINK. CALLING IT “IDLE” OR A “MORAL HAZARD” HAS ONE GOAL: TO IMPEDE THE FACTUAL INQUIRY. WHY DO THE WRITERS USING SUCH TERMS, WANT TO IMPEDE THE FACTUAL INQUIRY? THIS IS YET ANOTHER FACTUAL INQUIRY. AND SO IT GOES, UNTIL WE ACTUALLY HAVE REASONS FOR SAYING THE POLICY WAS INTENTIONAL (AND WHAT THE INTENTION, IN FACT, WAS), IDLE OR A MORAL HAZARD (WHATEVER THE LATTER TWO MEAN).    

CPRJanuary 20th, 2007 at 7:36 pm

JR,  Relax, mate. Read the full article again.   What Noland is trying to say is by the Fed sat “idly by” is to note that they did not raise rates to stop the flow of Ponzi liquidity.   The whole purpose of the article is to point out how misguided the Fed is on policy. In this respect, it does represent a “moral hazard” as it erodes the meaning of thrift, hard work, and real economic productivity.  

bsetserJanuary 20th, 2007 at 8:08 pm

this is brad setser. the following comment was recently posted on a blog post keyed off another Tett column that I wrote over the holdiays. I figure that it is more likely to generate an answer here, so I am pasting it in.   ”I have a very basic question about the mechanics of CPDO, I hope someone of you would be definately able to answer this. How the leverage(that is to be utilized)or conversly the target portfolio size is actually calculated for a ‘typical’ CPDO. I understand that the levarage is a function of the difference between the NAV and the present value of the payments (coupon, principal, admin expenses), and that leverage will be decreased with increase in NAV and vice versa; but i dont really get how exactly the target portfolio size or leverage is calculated. Say if NAV is $100, PV of payments is $200 at the start and the CPDO starts with a leverage of 15x then if the after say 6 months the NAV increases to $120 then how much will be the leverage at that time (i know it involves a lot of assumptions but i just want to know the mechanics of leverage calculation)    thanks “  

Ken ArmstrongJanuary 20th, 2007 at 8:40 pm

How is it that the Fed can recognize and act on a need for added liquidity to drop $’s from helicopters but feigns blindness and impotence when the opposite situation arises?  Nothing but lyin, cheatin thievin whores.

Aaron KrowneJanuary 20th, 2007 at 9:05 pm

Who can blame hedge funds for wanting to copy the magic of fractional reserve banking? Can anyone possibly claim what they are doing is immoral or dangerous while it is the very same thing the entire banking system does by design?  In fact, maybe they should win a financial innovation award for it!

LordJanuary 20th, 2007 at 10:51 pm

Sounds incredibly reminiscent of 1929. Where will the chips fall when buyers of volatility meet the default of the sellers and find their risk management imaginary?  

John J. XenakisJanuary 20th, 2007 at 11:27 pm

Gillian’s article makes very clear that there are two kinds of investors: Those who don’t know that there’s a crash coming, and those that do know, but are still earning commissions by convincing the first kind to keep buying into the bubble.  This is out and out fraud. Ms. Gett doesn’t seem to realize this, but what her article shows is that hedge fund managers in particular are committing fraud. They are making promises of / hinting at big returns when they know that those promises / hints won’t be met.  Managers and advisors have a fiduciary duty to their clients to give them the best professional advice available. Any advisor or manager who makes money by purposely giving incorrect advice is committing criminal fraud.  These advisors and managers think that they’re safe, because all their clients have signed multi-page small print contracts that say that the client is responsible for all losses. But those contracts won’t protect the managers and advisors from charges of criminal fraud.  Furthermore, no contract in the world will protect these managers and advisors from angry investors when they find out that the advisors protected themselves financially but didn’t protect their clients.  Do you remember what happened in 2001 after the Nasdaq crash and the Enron scandal? People wanted to put CEOs in jail — ALL CEOs, even perfectly honest ones. People were going crazy. Well, it’s going to happen again.  The Enron scandal is one historical example, but a better example might be the bankruptcy of the French Monarchy in 1789 that led to the French Revolution. In the Reign of Terror that followed, any person who was an aristocrat, a relative of an aristocrat, a friend of an aristocrat, a servant of an aristocrat, or even had a resemblance to an aristocrat, would be tried and quickly convicted and sentenced to the guillotine.  So I have some advice for the economics experts, journalists, professors, investors, central bankers, pundits and politicians that have been telling us that everything OK and getting better: You’d better have your underground bunker picked out, because people are going to be coming after you, and the guillotine is going to seem mild compared to the punishment that they’re going to want to inflict on you.  John J. Xenakis Generational Dynamics  

John J. XenakisJanuary 20th, 2007 at 11:33 pm

Gillian’s article makes very clear that there are two kinds of investors: Those who don’t know that there’s a crash coming, and those that do know, but are still earning commissions by convincing the first kind to keep buying into the bubble.  This is out and out fraud. Ms. Gett doesn’t seem to realize this, but what her article shows is that hedge fund managers in particular are committing fraud. They are making promises of / hinting at big returns when they know that those promises / hints won’t be met.  Managers and advisors have a fiduciary duty to their clients to give them the best professional advice available. Any advisor or manager who makes money by purposely giving incorrect advice is committing criminal fraud.  These advisors and managers think that they’re safe, because all their clients have signed multi-page small print contracts that say that the client is responsible for all losses. But those contracts won’t protect the managers and advisors from charges of criminal fraud.  Furthermore, no contract in the world will protect these managers and advisors from angry investors when they find out that the advisors protected themselves financially but didn’t protect their clients.  Do you remember what happened in 2001 after the Nasdaq crash and the Enron scandal? People wanted to put CEOs in jail — ALL CEOs, even perfectly honest ones. People were going crazy. Well, it’s going to happen again.  The Enron scandal is one historical example, but a better example might be the bankruptcy of the French Monarchy in 1789 that led to the French Revolution. In the Reign of Terror that followed, any person who was an aristocrat, a relative of an aristocrat, a friend of an aristocrat, a servant of an aristocrat, or even had a resemblance to an aristocrat, would be tried and quickly convicted and sentenced to the guillotine.  So I have some advice for the economics experts, journalists, professors, investors, central bankers, pundits and politicians that have been telling us that everything OK and getting better: You’d better have your underground bunker picked out, because people are going to be coming after you, and the guillotine is going to seem mild compared to the punishment that they’re going to want to inflict on you.  John J. Xenakis Generational Dynamics 

Dave IversonJanuary 20th, 2007 at 11:48 pm

So.. How long ’till mainstream American media wakes up? Right after the implosion? Like they did after the 29 crash? Some of us, labeled “permabears” have been follwing this for quite some time. But few have been listening. Here is a “rollup” from my Econ Dreams – Nightmares blog under category: Risk/Derivatives

Petter J BoltonJanuary 21st, 2007 at 6:05 am

Moral Hazard: John Ryskamp  Is everything that ain’t correct, and that is just about everything with ‘economics’ which includes the ‘theory’, the ‘practise’, the “experts”, the system(s) (global), and the credentialized economists.  In “science” if the theory cannot predict, then it is worthless; such is the state economic theory (theories) and all this, is then “Moral Hazard”.  I hope that this explains the triviality and uselessness of the pursuit of what must be categorized as ‘analytical paralysis’ (en global economics) in which both macro and micro economics face today; that is, “moral hazard”. 

AndrewJanuary 21st, 2007 at 7:16 am

FYI, if you want to be much richer by mid to end of 2008 than you are now  far out of the money SPY and DIA puts/put spreads Dec ’07 and various ’08 expiries  out of the money calls/call spreads on gold, silver Dec ’07 and various ’08 expiries  if you understand the link between politics and economics, you see REAL danger signs in the current middle east situations… this means FAR OUT OF THE MONEY crude oil calls/call spreads Dec ’07 and various ’08 expiries  if you want to send me a check, i won’t complain, but a thanks would be enough.  put your money where your mouth is, i am  but remember, RISK CAPITAL ONLY. unless you are a cowboy like me and plan to make 8 figures when the shyt hits the fan

GuestJanuary 21st, 2007 at 7:59 am

The Fed reserve system was put in place to combat excessive boom-bust cycles that arose from excessive credit creation and monetary expansion. The idea that the Fed should sit “idly by” or participate in the current speculative credit expansion appears to be a complete abrogation of this responsibility.   Within limits, expansion of the money supply following the NASDAQ crash, 9/11, the Iraq fiasco, slow job growth, and Katrina is reasonable. Hundreds of millions of Americans rely on a strong economy for our way of life.  The lunacy of the Fed is more in the degree, timing, and method of expansion than in the principle itself. When the song of the market masters begins to lull me to sleep, I remind myself that the gov’t's 2 – 2.5 % official inflation simply doesn’t jive with 100 % housing and commodity inflation, credit expansion, dollar deflation, the fiscal expansion, and trade imbalances.   Perhaps, the Fed’s currency rate position and attempt at controlled inflation will limit the carnage of violent bubble collapse. I hope so, because that is what is left. So far, so good. Where the hell were they 2 years ago.

Dave IversonJanuary 21st, 2007 at 9:19 am

John J. Xenakis says, “…Professor John Sterman, director of the MIT System Dynamics Group, as saying: ‘Thoughtful leaders increasingly recognize that we are not only failing to solve the persistent problems we face, but are in fact causing them. System dynamics is designed to help avoid such policy resistance and identify high-leverage policies for sustained improvement.’”  This is consitent with what the Post Keynesian writers have been saying for some time, although I’m not sure JX is aware of their work. I do like the inter-generational twist that JX throws in at his site. It reminds me of William Strauss and Neil Howe’s book, The Fourth Turning  For more on Post Keynesian financial economics, see my recent post responding to Mark Thoma and Brad DeLong and their replay of Krugman’s “The Hangover Theory,” In it I show how Hyman Minsky provides the answer. I also embedd four related hyperlinks, two of which point to Steve Keen’s “complexity theory” mathematical rendion of Minsky’s work. Eric Tymoigne has done much with that too over at the Levy Institute.  I also posted up a short overview of Minsky’s work, in A Minsky-like Restatement of Keynes Market Irrationality Warning.  All this to try to get folks to wake up to some newer, non-conventional economics thinking..

GuestJanuary 21st, 2007 at 9:34 am

This is a rerun. Get a copy of “Banking and the Business Cycle” by Phillips, McManus, and Nelson (1937). This script was played out in the 20s and 30s to the letter. Bernanke plagiarized the (highly disparaged) savings glut model even. It’s the best treatise I’ve read on the origins of the FIRST Great Depression.  Ryskamp is correct: Nobody could be so stupid. It must be intentional. Get a rope.

Aaron KrowneJanuary 21st, 2007 at 11:38 am

gmd:  On a related note, isn’t the fact that the FED is hiding M3 tied in with all of this excess credit? Is our true inflation rate, related to the size M3, 7 percent?, 8 percent? I would appreciate your thoughts, and anyone elses concerning M3.   I don’t think you’ll get a comment from “credentialed” economists on M3. The Fed discontinued it, therefore it doesn’t exist (and if you believe that, I’ve got a bridge to sell you).  However, The Economist once noted that broad money supply growth seems to always end up in inflation, long-term. Here’s a chart.

Dave IversonJanuary 21st, 2007 at 12:04 pm

Complimenting Roubini’s post, here is a little excerpt from Michael Shedlock’s Credit Swaps And Bond Yields post on Friday that gives us some perspective on system risk, Long wave K-Cycles, and more: “…Shannon Harrington: ‘A decline in the price of credit-default swap suggests improving perceptions of credit quality.’  [Michael Shedlock] Mish: Exactly. Please do not confuse perceptions with reality. Do not confuse perceptions with risk either.  Sarah Rowin: ‘A lot of people are calling for the bottom of the market, and by mid-2007 we should see some sort of recovery. Although earnings are going to be down, the builders could come off relatively intact.’  Mish: Does bottom calling mean it will happen or does it represent unwarranted optimism? How many bottom calls were there when the Naz started plunging from the peak over 5000? Has anyone bothered to look at cash and inventory levels on homebuilders? Sarah, please take a look at homebuilder corporate statements. They are running out of both cash and profits, while inventories are soaring.  Morgan Stanley: CDO sales surged last year to a record $497.1 billion, 81 percent more than in 2005. The funds, which are sliced up according to risk and sold as bonds, appeal to investors because they can offer higher yields than the assets being pooled.  Mish: We will take a look at the ‘appeal’ of higher yields in a chart below.  International Swaps: An estimated $26 trillion in the contracts are outstanding, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association said in September.  Mish: Wow. On the theory that ‘the bigger the bet the safer things must be’ this must be a sure sign that ‘Corporate Bonds Are Safe’.  Let’s take a look at a chart of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bonds to see what it might be saying. …”   Go and look for yourself, if still in doubt about systemic problems.   Dave Iverson Econ Dreams-Nightmares 

John RyskampJanuary 21st, 2007 at 1:46 pm

The whole purpose of the article is to point out how misguided the Fed is on policy. In this respect, it does represent a “moral hazard” as it erodes the meaning of thrift, hard work, and real economic productivity.   THOSE TERMS–THRIFT, HARD WORK, RECAL ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY–ARE MORE IDEOLOGY, AND WHAT IS MORE, I DON’T THINK THEY REFLECT WHAT WENT ON WHEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO SANCTION SUBPRIME MORTGAGES. WHAT IN FACT WENT ON IN FORMULATING THAT DECISION? AGAIN, WHAT WE NEED IS FACTUAL ANALYSIS. TOO MUCH ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VEERS OFF TOO RAPIDLY INTO THE NORMATIVE–PROBABLY BECAUSE PEOPLE JUST DON’T WANT TO INVESTIGATE FACTS. WHICH IS UNFORTUNATE. BUT DOES ANYONE REALLY THINK A DECISION WAS MADE TO DISCOURAGE ‘HARD WORK’? THAT’S NOT ANALYSIS–THAT’S A FRUSTRATION WITH ANALYSIS. AND IT IS FRUSTRATING, BUT TOSSING OUT LOADED TERMS IS ANOTHER WAY OF TRYING TO FRUSTRATE FACTUAL INQUIRY.  

JGUJanuary 21st, 2007 at 2:54 pm

Do we have any statistics on the percentage of the sub-prime loans? Thanks.  The indicators seem to point to a housing improvement, I’m just not convinced yet.

GuestJanuary 21st, 2007 at 3:17 pm

Here is a question I have for the board. I want to move out of stocks in my 401K. As my 401K does not have a cash option, what is my best recourse. I currently have it in Vanguard total bond market fund (VBMFX), I know it will go down as well, but have no clue of how exposed these are to the ponzi scheme. Can someone more knowledgable than I please comment? Thank you

Peter J BoltonJanuary 21st, 2007 at 4:20 pm

Core Principles: Laws of Causality – Moral Hazard  Common belief has it that for every ’cause’ there is an equal and opposite ‘effect’.  Wrong! Moral Hazard (at the core elements of understanding and perception).  Every cause – acting upon phenomenon of similar nature – creates a slight (mileage varies) resistence, and this resistence alters in response, the primary cause which again acts upon the resisting effect, to create the final manifesting ‘effect’. This is true for all things and takes the linearity fully out of all equations.  Get around this, and you begin to reduce ‘moral hazard’.  There is only one type of analysis to undertake meaningfully and that is “heretical” analysis, that is to say, question everything and accept nothing – no assumptions a priori. We must always strive for core principles in all matters.  Economics has become more of a consensual and fashionable statement for the Ayn Rand affairs of mere men, much like morality. Intellect has no need of fashion statements er morality and economics will never pursue the fashions of men’s impositions and wet dreams, whilst the underlying principles are ignored (not understood).  Stability leads to instability… H. Minski (and the Laws of Thermodynamics)  

VikasJanuary 21st, 2007 at 7:57 pm

I think they decided to hide M3 cause they knew that would be their strategy to avoid a Japan-like deflation as the hoousing bubble burst.  Flyin by the seat of their pants…  With so much inflationary pumping it’s hard to see a credit crunch though… instead, debase the currency and let China, India, Japan, Russia and Opec swallow the devaluation.

CPRJanuary 21st, 2007 at 8:26 pm

JR and others,  Some of these posts (myself included) are getting off-topic and a little silly. Let’s just deal with the factual realities out there. That will keep the argument grounded so that we don’t slip into the realm of politics or philosophy.   To that end…  There’s another great Gillian Tett article that deals with credit derivatives. The most meaningful point is the one Doug Noland argues each week. It is the point I’m constantly repeating to NR about the Ponzi: The Fed needs to raise rates to at least 6% but maybe to 7% to slow things down.   The “moral hazard” of the Fed is failing to do their job in order to keep a bunch of politicians and Wall Street con-artists happy.   Here is the factual point laid out by Gillian Tett:   ”So does this leave central bankers less powerful than before? Independent Strategy, a research group, points out that the derivatives and structured finance sectors have recently grown so fast that they have come to dwarf traditional measures of liquidity – such as a narrow definition of money (cash and bank reserves) or a broader measure (including bank deposits and loans).  Consequently, these monetary yardsticks no longer provide meaningful guides to liquidity, it claims – while the role that central banks play in money creation is also falling, making it harder for them to shape the credit cycle. That, Independent Strategy concludes, explains one of the great mysteries of the past two years: why the cost of borrowing in the capital markets has remained low even though central banks have been raising rates.  ”Rising policy interest rates have had no effect on slowing the expansion of liquidity . . . because increases in short-term rates did not cascade into the pricing of the bigger . . . tranches of the liquidity pyramid,” the group says in a research report. “Now new-fangled financial instruments create liquidity independent of central bank control.”  Such arguments – unsurprisingly – find no great favour among central bankers themselves. Instead, most believe that rate rises can still affect the more esoteric parts of the system, since the different parts of the financial world are ultimately interconnected.”  For the full article:   http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a5daab98-a43c-11db-bec4-0000779e2340.html    

Peter J BoltonJanuary 21st, 2007 at 9:56 pm

CPR:  With respect, your latest post is rather a contradiction, don’t you think?  Science is derived out of philosophy and I (for one) have tried to restrain my positings to the context of this Blog, to science.  And to this end, politics and philosophy certainly impacts economics as your quoted article appears (to me ) to support.  ”esoteric” essentially means not yet known or understood, that is not exoteric which, certainly supports the argument that “economics” cannot be meaningfully approached by a constrained analysis of a narrow band of lagging statistics which have been categorized badly (“Newtonian Sleep” – Blake) and are manipulated at the will and to the joy of an incompetant, fanatical and ideologically deterministic warmongering Administration.  Minski inadvertantly shewed the evidence that supports that economics behave in a similar manner to the Laws of Thermodynamics and of course, Minski did not consider himself to be a philosopher but then he didn’t consider himself a scientist either (?).  Perhaps I read too much into your post, but then I thought that it was totally valid for the context of this Blog:-)  Ponzi is a term that suggests deterministic fraud and is certainly correct if politic discussion is permitted but the global Stock Exchanges are actually more similar at their core level to Casinos (gambling) where “Ponzi” suggests manipulation thereof.  The pursuit of profiteering lies in the structure of financial instruments (new) that allow cash and credit to be allocated (leveraged and further leveraged) to those that demand capital and cash where, those structuring these new financial instruments are those same organizations (in the main) that are demanding that same capital and cash being “re-organized”.  The results are obvious and the stresses (turbulences)caused by unconstrained manipulations, will seek (are seeking), must find correction. However, what is happening now, is that newer and more exotic manipulations are in play which are believed to be the answer of ad infinitum linear energy conservation; they will not succeed due to the premise that instability must reach its run end, just as stability is a runend of its cycle. The pendulum always turns just past its threshold and this my friend, is science.  Bulls (on this Blog) appear to be similar to those that have won at the roulette table by consistently betting on red (or black) and are trying to tell everybody to follow their lead while not considering for a moment that eventually the tables will turn against them – as the Bank always wins.  My bet is that the Fed has no idea and will, a priori, make decisions that will bring global collapse in their attempts to pursue the warm favour from the body politic du jour and all that hangs off it..  peter

GuestJanuary 21st, 2007 at 10:53 pm

Keynes wrote in The Economic Consequences of the Peace  Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currency. By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security, but at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth. Those to whom the system brings windfalls, beyond their deserts and even beyond their expectations or desires, become ‘profiteers,’ who are the object of the hatred of the bourgeoisie, whom the inflationism has impoverished, not less than of the proletariat. As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all permanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery.  Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.  The Fed is unwittingly supporting Lenin and Chavez more every day…

GuestJanuary 21st, 2007 at 11:14 pm

Guest: You wrote …  ”I want to move out of stocks in my 401K. As my 401K does not have a cash option, what is my best recourse. “  First, are you sure that you don’t have access to cash? In financial lingo, that would mean that you have access to a money market account. Surely Vanguard has plenty of those – it would be very surprising if your retirement plan does not have at least one choice for a money market account. You should definitely call a Vanguard rep and ask them about money market choices. If you do decide to go with a money market, the safest funds in that category are those tied to short-term US Treasuries. Again, ask your retirement plan specialist – I’m sure Vanguard would have such an option.  Do NOT get freaked out by the discussion going on in this blog. The situation with derivatives has evolved over the last 15 years. While the high level of leverage is definitely troubling, there is also no concrete evidence that the whole scheme is going to crumble tomorrow. Hedge fund failures could occur this year – but the potential impact is unknown.  If you choose to park all your 401K into a money market account, then you are accepting a 5% interest rate in exchange for a high level of security. Some people are indeed making that choiuce at the current time. However, in the event that the stock market goes up in the first one or two quarters in 2007. you could also miss out on potentially higher levels of gain from other types of investments (selected stock funds)   Ony YOU can choose the tradeoff between risk and return that you want with your retirement plan. Do your research carefully, and evaluate a range of opinions before making a decision.  Pete, CA 

RickJanuary 21st, 2007 at 11:36 pm

” Your species insists on destroying itself, you pollute your own environment while depleting it’s natural resources. Your kind also refuses to learn from history, take your economic practices for example.”   The Chief Machine speaking to Morpheous in THE MATRIX  p.s. bubble still in metamorph-stage noting how CNBC pumps hedgies on a daily basis, only station where I mute the programming (except bond report) and enjoy the commercials……

RickJanuary 21st, 2007 at 11:39 pm

Guest did you say you want to move out of stocks, you realize this site is monitored by homeland security right?

AnonymousJanuary 22nd, 2007 at 1:11 am

One of the interesting and, again, highly disturbing features of credit derivatives is that their trading processes tend to be primitive. Deals seem to be recorded with pen and paper – and one imagines on cramped and overwritten shirt-cuffs – while hedge funds and banks scramble to improve their credit-derivatives trading systems by spending hundreds of millions of dollars in aggregate on suitable information technology. As reported by the London Financial Times on 16 August 2006, “Credit derivatives are tools that let investors place bets on whether bonds or loans will default. The industry is estimated to have $17,000bn of total outstanding contracts…and the sector has doubled in size every year since 2002. This growth has taken institutions by surprise and forced them to handle deals with small levels of support staff. A recent survey from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association showed that one in five credit derivatives trades by large dealers in 2005 contained mistakes and many suffered settlement delays.” All of this sharpens the picture of a financial industry in the dollar size of its deals as big as or bigger than anything in financial history, being conducted by unmonitored institutions and dealers, with staffs that are largely inexperienced and, as the Financial Times puts it, with “sloppy back-office procedures [that] could cause serious damage.” The financial magnitudes they handle are indeed so great that they could, it seems, precipitate a global crash of unprecedented proportions; yet they are being run with some of their procedures apparently comparable with those of a church-fête bingo game – Extract from “America’s Suicidal Statecraft” by Dr James Cumes  

AnonymousJanuary 22nd, 2007 at 2:20 am

Dear Professor, This is a serious question: have you ever been treated for clinical depression or bipolar disorder? Your absolute fascination with the negative appears symptomatic of some sort of mental illness.

Peter J BoltonJanuary 22nd, 2007 at 3:39 am

Anonymous:  ”This is a serious question: have you ever been treated for clinical depression or bipolar disorder? Your absolute fascination with the negative appears symptomatic of some sort of mental illness.” Written by Anonymous on 2007-01-22 02:20:57  Functioning sentient humans (homo sapien sapien) have the unique capacity of “negation” and this capacity is expressed in scientific maxims whereby any theory must a priori allow for and indeed encapsulated the negative.  I call this “heretical research” and the integrity of our scientific pursuits and indeed the advance of civilization, depends critically on being able to question (Theory)from a negative position. To do otherwise is insane, childish and highly dangerous; er suicidal.  The Professor’s approach imo is professional correct although I consider his constraint and limitations of his analysis to “consensual” statistics (lagging) to be a ubiquitous and major problem area of his whole profession; economics. However, this of course, is his chosen approach which must be respected, but the quality of his work has been to date of the highest integrity while we all must realize that he is not the final word on economics and the fact that there is NO “silver bullet” solution, in any dynamic and non-linear phenomenal event.  OTOH maniacal egophrenia is a serious mental illness that affects those of the financial industries (and elsewhere)in their pursuit of more valueless fiat, than they need. I do not see Prof Roubini suffering from this insanity but I certainly do see it in others (on this Blog and elswhere).  peter  

GammaJanuary 22nd, 2007 at 8:26 am

Someone suggested rates need to go to 6 or 7% and M3 growth needs to slow down. If both happen sufficiently, then we’ll realllllly have something to talk about. :)

bowolfJanuary 22nd, 2007 at 9:07 am

This business of too much credit gets to the heart of the matter: The reason that there is too much credit is that there is too little liquidity. The world is facing a massive liquidity crisis, and up to now the answer has been more credit. Why else do you think that the Fed is turning a blind eye to traditional measures of money supply, and the massive increase in home equity ATM money? It is simply that households cannot be maintained with current supplies of money. More has to be manufactured to keep the wheels turning.  This is the economy of the wolf. There will be nothing left when we have start over again.  Snarl 

John RyskampJanuary 22nd, 2007 at 11:30 am

“Rising policy interest rates have had no effect on slowing the expansion of liquidity . . . because increases in short-term rates did not cascade into the pricing of the bigger . . . tranches of the liquidity pyramid,” the group says in a research report. “Now new-fangled financial instruments create liquidity independent of central bank control.”    Such arguments – unsurprisingly – find no great favour among central bankers themselves. Instead, most believe that rate rises can still affect the more esoteric parts of the system, since the different parts of the financial world are ultimately interconnected.”     THIS SOUNDS LIKE FAUX LIQUIDITY. WHERE IS IT GOING?

Dale C.January 22nd, 2007 at 12:54 pm

This is a great discussion, and the credit bubble is something that I, as an individual investor, am trying hard to understand in detail. But I admit that I have a stupid question.  In Trett’s original article, when the banker talks about “deeply subordinated tranches of collateralised debt obligations, which are nine times levered”, how exactly is the leverage calculated? If I, as an investor in mortgages, buy a mortgage, I pay the Net Present Value, but if the homeowner has only put 15% down, does that mean that I am now nine times leveraged? Is that the leverage that the banker is referring to?   Or, does the CDO contain an aggregation of mortgages, which are worth 9 times the capital that the investors in the CDO have put in, and the rest of the capital was provided by borrowing it?   Which is it? Or do I have it wrong entirely? If anyone knows, please reply here or send me an e-mail by clicking on my user name.  Thanks,  Dale C.

DampmanJanuary 22nd, 2007 at 1:58 pm

There is a fair amount of faux liquidity running down my pants leg right now…only I don’t think it’s very “faux”.  Dampman

AlbrtJanuary 23rd, 2007 at 12:05 am

Russ Winter had a couple of recent posts on this issue – the comments were particularly informative.  I believe that the number 9 comes from a calculation similar to your second option – the amount the originators or their backers put up to fund the loans. That number is ancient history by the time the mortgages go into default. If an investor wanted to collect from the originator, the leverage would probably be much higher because the originator probably has not retained much capital at all for the purpose of making good on the CDO if it crashes and burns.  However, because the CDO holders are normally limited to collecting from the assets of the trust behind the CDO, a more relevant measure of leverage would be the obligations of the CDO trust compared to the value of the collateral. That number would probably “only” be 2 or 3. Maybe 4. OK possibly 5, considering expenses and the possibility of a long wind up. But the exposure to this leverage on the downside is heavily skewed to the bottom tranches of the CDO.

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