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The Kapali Carsi

Interpreting Turkish Election Results (Cont.)

This is the addendum to yesterday’s Hurriyet Daily News column, which was also posted here.

First, let’s start with voter political tendencies. My friend Sinan, the oxymoronic-sounding leftist ex-trader Fenerbahce fan (I am not sure which part is more oxymoronic though) told me that in the last two decades, the voting share has been distributed as 2/3 – 1/3 between right and left-wing parties. Normally, there were at least three major right-wing parties, and only one left-wing one, so the CHP, SHP or DSP had a decent chance of winning an election. At the time of the DYP-ANAP merger before the 2007 elections, the combined party was seen as getting 15% or so in the elections, which would have led to a coalition government. BTW, there is a really funny story about the politics piece I wrote at the time; if nothing, it tells a lot about the quality of media monkeys commentators and the PM’s temper. Anyway, I guess voters were pissed off the merger did not go through, and both parties were forced to below the threshold. Fugitive businessman Cem Uzan’s (he wasn’t on the run at the time, I guess the government found him dangerous after his election success, as he was a crook long before the AKP started going after him) GP party was also strong at the time.  So with all these parties gone, the right wing belongs now to the AKP. In sum, as someone once said, “There isn’t a center-left, but a center-right problem in Turkey”…

Second, I have a few things to say about ex-CHP leader Deniz Baykal’s (aka Denise the Menace) claim that the CHP was not successful in the elections. Unsuccessful it may have been, but KONDA time series data show that the party’s vote was hovering around its core of 20 percent until current leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu came to power, when it suddenly overshot, surpassing 30% briefly, before settling around 25%. I still haven’t decided whether the sudden and temporary increase in CHP votes was due to Kılıçdaroğlu’s coming to power or former leader Deniz Baykal’s finally relinquishing his seat, though:) But one thing is clear, the CHP was not, contrary to what Baykal is claiming, at 29-30% right before he resigned.

Third, I would like to add a couple of things to my observations on voting for the leader. As my friend Eren from KONDA noted, you’d normally expect leader fanaticism to increase as votes are going down, as only the core voters remain. So it is normal to see more leader fanaticism in the MHP. But what it more surprising is that many more (compared  to 2009) CHP and AKP supporters vote for their respective parties because of  their leaders as well! For the CHP, we can easily say that Kilicdaroglu is much more popular than his predecessor Baykal. But for the AKP, I have no logical explanation, just a couple of hypotheses: It may be that all the anti-Israeli and nationalistic rhetoric has made its impact for Erdogan. But unfortunately, KONDA surveys do not have any questions that would help us to reach a definite conclusion on this matter.

Fourth, there is much more to the AKP’s success at the polls than growth and unemployment: There is a deeper economic concept going on here: For one thing, free healthcare has improved under the AKP, and I applaud them for that. But there is also TOKI, the affordable housing contractor. In the last few years, the agency has turned into a regular construction company, but one whose goal is not to maximize profits, but to make as many people with houses as possible, at whatever cost! And thanks to changes the AKP did a few years back, their arrears are not part of the budget. So in effect, it is a “cost-free” vote-gathering mechanism for the AKP. Note that the former president of TOKI is now AKP deputy from the lovely town of Trabzon! Finally, render unto the AKP what is the AKP’s, but the party is an expert in infrastructure development. I am not sure if they build the best quality cheapest, but they do get the job done, and that’s what the ordinary public sees. But all this is not to say that traditional economics is not important: According to research from Yapi Kredi, the lower-middle & middle-income classes have increased their share of total income, at the expense of the richest (contrary to popular wisdom, the poorest have not, despite the fact that Erdogan is touted for as man of the people) under the AKP. But even without looking at data, a short drive through buzzing streets of Umraniye or Gungoren would convince you to the YKB findings.

Last but not the least, the 10% threshold has been in the AKP’s favor, as voters of the various baby right-wing parties have congregated around the AKP to make sure their vote is not wasted. In fact, KONDA’s error in the elections has stemmed from overestimating votes for these parties. It seems that there was a considerable last-minute switch from these parties to the AKP.

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