EconoMonitor

RGE Analysts

Neither monetary policy nor half a billion dollars is what it used to be …

Michael Mandel’s Business Week cover story poses an intriguing thesis in a provocative way: 

“No matter which party you belong to, or which Big Idea or school of economic policy you subscribe to, one thing is clear: Globalization has overwhelmed Washington’s ability to control the economy.”

Mandel hints at an equally bold solution – global institutions for macroeconomic management that replace national institutions.

a Big Big Idea–probably too big to even consider right now–would be the creation of global institutions for governing the world economy. History tells us that market economies are prone to financial crises, to which the only solution is a strong central bank.  ….  But with the explosive growth of China and India, that sort of [crisis management] role for the Fed is no longer feasible, and no new institution has arisen to take its place. …. The best solution would be some sort of global central bank with real powers–but that’s not going to happen until there’s a big enough financial crisis to truly scare people.

Mandel’s right.   Replacing the Fed with a super-sized and super-powerful IMF – one that that acts like a central bank, not a (moderately-sized) global credit union — is a big step, one that is not likely to happen soon.  [Note: I edited this section in response to Mandel's comment]

I liked the article — and think it raises an important set of issues.   So I feel somewhat bad highlighting a couple of points of potential disagreement.   But only somewhat.

Globalization does potentially alter the effectiveness of certain macroeconomic tools.   Higher policy (short-term) rates do not always lead higher long-term rates any more.  Europe now has its own bond yield conundrum.     

But I am not sure if Mandel’s broad analytical point that globalization has reduced the effectiveness of all macroeconomic tools holds.  It seems true for monetary policy.   But not necessarily for fiscal policy.

If a widening fiscal deficit doesn’t crowd out domestic investment but rather draws in global savings, expansionary fiscal policy – ironically – becomes a potentially more effective tool for stimulating aggregate demand.    There is less “crowding out” – though perhaps, as Mandel notes, more of the expansionary impulse bleeds out into the world economy through higher demand for imports.  

The same, I think, applies in reverse as well — tight fiscal policy should have more of a contractionary impulse.   If loose fiscal policy doesn’t push up interest rates because it has a small impact on global savings, tight fiscal policy may not help to lower rates – that would make it hard stimulus from falling interest rates to offset (in part) the contractionary impact of fiscal tightening.    

That is why the “macroeconomics of a savings glut” are more of a challenge to “deficits matter” Rubinomics than to “don’t tax but still spend” Bush-o-nomics.

Though it isn’t obvious to me that the core insights of Rubinomics wouldn’t still hold if there wasn’t something of a global savings glut — not all countries are small relative to even the global economy, and not all countries can call on global savings for as much financing as they want as easily as the US has over the past few years.

The effectiveness of national macroeconomic policy in a global economy – no doubt – the core issue Mandel raises. 

But I also wanted to pick up on another point Mandel makes.  Mandel notes that US private equity invested $400million in China and India in the third quarter alone.

Money is following as well, with U.S. venture capitalists investing more than $400 million in Chinese and Indian companies in the third quarter alone, according to the National Venture Capital Assn.

Alas, in the current global context, even $500 million in a quarter is chump change.

It is about how much China lends to the US on an average day!

We know that was the case between the end of June 2004 and the end of June 2005.   During that 365 day period, China bought about $185b of US bonds.    We also know from the TIC data that China bought a lot more than $500 million a day in the month of August.      Its net purchases of US debt in August totaled almost $24b.   The TIC historically has tended to understate Chinese purchases, though the August number is big enough that I suspect it is less understated than usual …  

Chinese purchases may have fallen a bit in September, but proably not in October. China’s $24b October trade surplus works out to a $30b monthly current account surplus – and if China kept 50% of its October current account surplus in dollars, that still works out to a flow of about a half a billion a day into the US bond market.

China now is in a position to lend the US half a billion a day and still have half a billion a day left over to lend to Europe. 

Moreover, the funds flowing into China from FDI and private equity and the like are – macroeconomically speaking – recycled back into US debt.  Chinese savings more than suffices to finance China’s own high rate of investment, so China has no need to import US savings to finance investment in China.    So total Chinese demand for the world’s debt – counting equity inflows that are recycled back into the US/ European bond market — was probably around $35b or so in October. 

And that is just for one month.   Not a full quarter. 

Right now, the US is the big borrower, not the big lender, on the world stage.   The US is a country in need for foreign investment to make up for its own lack of savings, not the source of investment capital for the world. 

At least in aggregate.   The US has a huge stock of accumulated wealth, and obviously it can – and is — shifting some of that accumulated wealth into investment in emerging economies.    But if it does so, it only increases the amount it has to borrow from abroad.  The US cannot finance domestic investment in the US – let alone foreign investments – out of its own savings.

Mandel gets this better than most.  He notes that foreign savings now finances a large share of gross US investment.   And that:

Now many of the levers affecting the U.S. economy are located not in Washington but in Beijing, London, and even Mexico City.

Frankly, he should add Abu Dhabi, Riyahd and Moscow to that list … the big oil exporters are – collectively — exerting as much financial clout as China right now.

No Responses to “Neither monetary policy nor half a billion dollars is what it used to be …”

Dave ChiangNovember 10th, 2006 at 6:53 pm

“Mandel’s suggested solution is equally bold – global institutions for macroeconomic management that replace national institutions. That’s a big step. Bye-bye Fed. Hello, a super-sized and super-powerful IMF – one that that acts like a central bank, not a (moderately-sized) global credit union.” – BusinessWeek

A super-sized and super-powerful IMF nicely fits into the Washington Consensus agenda for US Global Hegemony. Good luck in getting any other sovereign nation in the world to commit to the radical Neo-liberalism economic policy. I seriously doubt that the Chinese or any other Asian nation would agree to those terms of economic surrender by permitting the IMF to control their respective nations’ monetary policy. Michael Mandel must have been smoking something pretty strong to have dreamed up this ludicrious idea :-)

StormyNovember 10th, 2006 at 9:45 pm

Mandel is right, to a certain extent.

But physical locations are not the issue anymore. The levers can be anywhere, including Cayman Islands, which, by the way does very nice chump change.

We have moved into an era where individual countries are slowly losing control–and, I would put China in that boat as well.

Big money, big investments, big companies–both financial and otherwise–can be and are being located anywhere it best suits them. Whatever place offers the best enticements–off they go.

Over a year ago I raised this issue. Once companies in the states set up bidding wars among towns and cities. Now those bidding wars are among countries. Who really is control?

Mandel is right about strong international institutions; they are needed. Right now, those extant haven’t a clue–neither do the politicians who keep the fiction of nationalism alive.

Good post.

As an aside, I bet a lot of people are surprised to see Mexico City on the list. I don’t. (A further aside: Bet few people have an actual image of what Mexico City looks like. They have images of Moscow, New York, Tokyoto, etc.)

GuestNovember 10th, 2006 at 10:01 pm

Brad:

A global institution acting like a central bank? Isn’t the Federal Reserve playing this role to a certain, although complicated, extent: creating dollars that go abroad and are held by foreign central banks — institutions which then pyramid their domestic currencies on top of dollar/foreign reserves?

AnonymousNovember 10th, 2006 at 10:20 pm

It ain’t the lack of savings that the US lacks. The US lacks production. Without production, we all work in a restaurant for tips.

GuestNovember 11th, 2006 at 6:50 am

“A super-sized and super-powerful IMF nicely fits into the Washington Consensus agenda for US Global Hegemony.”

Far better that than Chinese global hegemony. That truly would be a fate worse than death for the vast majority of people on the planet. I can just see protests: “We are all Tibetans now.”

GuestNovember 11th, 2006 at 6:59 am

Interesting that Mandell chose to focus on venture capital investment:

“India Inc is coming of age it appears. On one hand, it is attracting huge equity investments from private equity funds, and on the other, it is now acquiring global companies like never before… According to a Grant and Thornton report, private equity fund in flows from January to October this year have touched $6 billion, a whopping 250 per cent increase from last year and more than 200 private equity deals have been struck this year. “…what we are now looking at is the infrastructure and real estate sectors which are poised for significant growth especially once the regulations ease up and more foreign investments comes into the sector…,” …And with the Tata Corus deal leading the way, Indian companies have made $15.72 billion worth of cross border M&A deals, which accounts for over 60 per cent of the total $24 billion worth of M&A till October this year…” http://www.domain-b.com/finance/general/20061109_investment.html

re: “Bet few people have an actual image of what Mexico City looks like.”

What is North America’s Spanish speaking population? And what is the value of annual remittances flowing from the US to Mexico? And how (extensively) are Canadian banks involved in Mexico?

“The shock felt here this week after three bombs exploded in various parts of Mexico City was partly calmed by the communiqué delivered late Monday. “We take full responsibility…” wrote the Revolutionary Co-ordination… Why was a Bank of Nova Scotia branch bombed?…” http://www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/story/GAM.20061110.IBLETTER10/GIStory/

re: “Globalization has overwhelmed Washington’s ability to control the economy.”

was there a ever a time when Washington could accurately ‘measure’ or ‘control’ the economy?

“…at its frontiers economics is changing dramatically in exciting and challenging ways. But almost all economics as it is actually taught and practised lags many years behind…” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d0cd9ee2-6d3b-11db-9a4d-0000779e2340.html

Dave ChiangNovember 11th, 2006 at 8:48 am

“Far better that than Chinese global hegemony. That truly would be a fate worse than death for the vast majority of people on the planet.”

US Aircraft Carrier Battlegroups regularily conduct military exercises off the Chinese coastline, not the other way around. Imagine what the reaction in Washington would be if a Chinese warship was spotted off the coast of Long Island NY, or if a Chinese spy aircraft crashed into an US Airforce fighter off Long Beach California, not China’s Hainan Island. In a press conference speech, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that the Chinese were a “strategic military threat to the United States”. Those were pretty strong words from the US Secretary of Defense. Imagine the reaction in Washington if the Chinese Central Military Command Chairman made the equilvalent speech about the United States. I think it is perfectly clear to the rest of the world, who is threatening whom.

GuestNovember 11th, 2006 at 1:36 pm

Trying to get back on topic, this year’s Human Development Report provides some insights into contemporary problems of defining and measuring economic growth.

“…According to the Human Development Report 2006, states like the UAE (49), Kuwait (33) and Qatar (46) are amongst the richest in the world in terms of GDP per-capita. However, their [Human Development Index] ranking places them among much poorer states like Mexico (53), Romania (60) and Argentina (36)…” http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/business/2006/November/business_November319.xml&section=business

China is ranked 81 and the Russian Federation 65 on that index (http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/), although Russia may be striving to improve its score by developing an appreciation for environmental economics: “…Mr Mitvol has estimated that putting right damage allegedly caused by Shell on Sakhalin Island in the Russian far east could cost up to $50bn…” http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,1945367,00.html

GuestNovember 11th, 2006 at 2:41 pm

“Far better that than Chinese global hegemony. That truly would be a fate worse than death for the vast majority of people on the planet.”

Wow! Alarm bells go off when I see things like this. Isn’t this what Al Qaeda woud say regarding US involvement in Middle East? Scary what this world is coming to.

LCNovember 11th, 2006 at 2:49 pm

I think Micael Mandel has a pretty good idea. If US or Chinese can’t resolve the imbalance by themselves, a super IMF and super Fed could do the job. I disagree with Dave Chiang and think the Chinese could support the idea. I would assume the Chinese, as the main creditors, would have just as much influence in this organization as US, if not more.

bsetserNovember 11th, 2006 at 4:08 pm

Mandel didn’t explicitly call for super-sizing the imf and turning it into a true global central bank — another institution could play that role. what he did argue is that the global contect (low policy rates in japan/ dollar reserve growth/ savings glut) has muted the impact of the fed’s tightening on its own …

of course, one response to the fact that higher-short-term rates haven’t pushed up long-rates is to hike short-rates even more — offsetting the impact of other forces. I am not sure that the fed is impotent.

finally, “fate worse than death” style language also strikes me as extreme.

LC — we are a long way from a world where either the fed or the PBoC cede control over global money to a new institution … tho we are in a world where the PBoC has by virtue of a policy choice (the de facto $ peg) lost much of its autonomy, and where the transmission channels of fed policy are changing as the global context changes. but i suspect coordination will be tried as a solution (assuming folks decide they want one) before some form of strengthened international institution (i.e. a global central bank).

ReformerRayNovember 11th, 2006 at 7:08 pm

“The US cannot finance domestic investment in the US – let alone foreign investments – out of its own savings”.

Brad – The truth of that sentence depends upon what the definition of savings is. If Savings refers to the -35 billion reported in the National Accounts as Personal Savings, then the sentence is correct. If Savings refers to the 1.8 trillion dollars of savings that is equal to the trade deficit plus investment, then the sentence is true.

If “savings” in that sentence refers to monies or assets produced in a year by the U.S. economy that is not consumed in that year, then the sentence is false. The Net Operating Surplus of Private Enterprises records, each year, an approximation to profits. In 2005, the amount was 2.9 trillion dollars. It is this amount, plus inflation in the value of financial assets, which produced the Net gain of Net Worth in 2005 of around 4 trillion dollars in 2005. This gain in financial assets each year is more than enough to pay the 2005 domestic investment bill (both private and public)of 2.5 trillion.

But this money is not what is used to pay the domestic investment bill each year. Domestic investment is paid from retained earnings (included in the numbers shown as gain in Net Worth) and loans and equity investment and government financing.

The bottom line. Lack of savings as reported by BEA does not show the creation and retention of financial assets each year that are available in the U.S. to finance domestic investment.

I realize that I am arguing with the conventional wisdom, not just you.

I write this because I think a lot of false conclusions are drawn from a lack of understanding of the role of profits and inflation in values of financial assets in creating U.S. wealth (savings in the broad sense as defined above).

ReformerRayNovember 11th, 2006 at 7:08 pm

“The US cannot finance domestic investment in the US – let alone foreign investments – out of its own savings”.

Brad – The truth of that sentence depends upon what the definition of savings is. If Savings refers to the -35 billion reported in the National Accounts as Personal Savings, then the sentence is correct. If Savings refers to the 1.8 trillion dollars of savings that is equal to the trade deficit plus investment, then the sentence is true.

If “savings” in that sentence refers to monies or assets produced in a year by the U.S. economy that is not consumed in that year, then the sentence is false. The Net Operating Surplus of Private Enterprises records, each year, an approximation to profits. In 2005, the amount was 2.9 trillion dollars. It is this amount, plus inflation in the value of financial assets, which produced the Net gain of Net Worth in 2005 of around 4 trillion dollars in 2005. This gain in financial assets each year is more than enough to pay the 2005 domestic investment bill (both private and public)of 2.5 trillion.

But this money is not what is used to pay the domestic investment bill each year. Domestic investment is paid from retained earnings (included in the numbers shown as gain in Net Worth) and loans and equity investment and government financing.

The bottom line. Lack of savings as reported by BEA does not show the creation and retention of financial assets each year that are available in the U.S. to finance domestic investment.

I realize that I am arguing with the conventional wisdom, not just you.

I write this because I think a lot of false conclusions are drawn from a lack of understanding of the role of profits and inflation in values of financial assets in creating U.S. wealth (savings in the broad sense as defined above).

AnonymousNovember 11th, 2006 at 7:42 pm

Brad – Regarding a super-sized IMF, do you have any thoughts on Keynes’ post-World War II proposal for an “International Clearing Union,” and more contemporaneously, Warren Buffett’s idea of “Import Certificates” [see Fortune, 11/10/03] that Senators Dorgan and Feingold [Balanced Trade Restoration Act of 2006] are pushing to rebalance global trade?

Can they work? What might be some unintended consequences? What could a transition plan to implement them look like?

GuestNovember 12th, 2006 at 7:07 am

re: “the role of profits and inflation in values of financial assets in creating U.S. wealth”

Are ‘financial services’ part of CPI – and if not, shouldn’t this category be included? It would be interesting to see an estimate of inflation in that category (whether or not it includes certain types of legal and accounting services?):

“…Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, rose 84.3% over the 20-year period ended September 2006, or 3.1% a year, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Some expense categories, however, have significantly outpaced the overall rate of inflation. The following are the most notable: College Tuition (289.5%); Hospital Services (280.4%); Drugs (177.6%); and Energy (131.9%)…” http://www.ftportfolios.com/index.aspx

This ramble only to ask if we have to pay closer attention to just what exactly all the saving and spending is achieving or how it’s accounted for. Mandel’s suggestion that some (parts) of the above categories may be classified as ‘investments’ may be somewhat misguided, given the magnitude of spending misallocations to advertising, medical treatments at the expense of prevention and abuses of insurance programs, to name a few, in healthcare alone.

Commitment to the idea that a good education is something that requires more spending: “We still need to spend more on education” might also be somewhat misplaced when there is so little understanding of the economics of this category, except that the returns seem to be diminishing as the costs rise: “real wages for young Americans with a bachelor’s degree have declined by almost 8% over the past three years”.

Mandel’s brief mention of tax related distortions doesn’t seem to acknowledge the full extent of how tax is impacting capital flows and asset valuations – including currencies. Global differences in property and shareholder rights also loom large, as the economic health and power of citizens, governments and corporations seems to be less dependent on employment and increasingly dependent on asset bases which can be diversified across many legal systems. Also interesting to see the common assumption that more dedicated r&d spending is good when the economics of intellectual property in general is still not well understood.

As we speak of globalizing institutions, also have to ask if we need to better understand the relationships between emerging powerful players and entities – the oligarchs, ‘hedgefunds’, mutual and pension funds, corporate entities and the banks with their respective governments? Khodorkovsky is one reminder that the oligarch ultimately enjoys, usually his, wealth and power with the cooperation of a home state.

As for globalizing regions outside of the US, interesting that Gulf investors seem to be increasing their investments abroad, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aYWA6Qhvb2.U&refer=home, while the Dubai Financial Market has suffered a 63% slump since the turn of the year making it the world’s worst performing gauge, according to Bloomberg and the Gulf region’s markets suffer their worst year since 2001, according to menafn.com. In this example and thinking back to previous posts, if there may be some value in relating discussions about Gulf currency pegs and reserve diversification to the very international flavour of the Gulf’s main financial hub, one indication of that in the closest example I can grab:

“Offshore Trust Services will be offered through a separate and wholly owned offshore company known as National Bank of Dubai Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. This has been established with the support of NBD’s alliance partner Royal Bank of Canada’s trust company in Jersey… This alliance thus combines the presence of one of the Middle East’s strongest regional banks with Royal Bank of Canada Global Private Banking, the international private banking arm of Royal Bank of Canada… [Royal Bank of Canada] Global Private Banking is a North American leader and one of the top 15 providers of global private banking services internationally… National Bank of Dubai… is regarded as one of the most prominent banking institutions in the [UAE]…” – National Bank of Dubai introduces Offshore Trust Service, United Arab Emirates, 02/18/02 (The Dubai Bullion Desk was established and is managed by ScotiaMocatta at the National Bank of Dubai, Ref: ScotiaMocatta website)

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 8:45 am

I would amend the Mandel view slightly – Globalization has overwhelmed the ability of the nation state to control financial flows and the financial section of their economy.

However, globalization has not overwhelmed the ability of the nation state to control imports. The only reason the U.S. does not limit imports to reduce the trade deficit is that we do not want to. That is, we have not yet seen the necessity to reject existing treaties and agreements so as to legalize import restrictions sufficient to reduce the U. S. trade deficit.

Financal assets are not part of the shopping cart of the typical urban dweller, hence are not included in the CPI. Other measures of inflation can be used. I do not know which, if any, of these other measures include inflation of the value of financial assets.

I think inflation of the value of financial assets is one of the major reasons the value of the dollar is higher today than it was in mid – 1995, when the U.S. stock market began to grow so rapidly.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 9:04 am

I apologize for the double entries. I do not know why it is happening.

As for the new bill Balanced Trade Restoration Act of 2006, my comment is it is about time. Finally, some legislator has the guts to propose the goal of equal trade.

I do not think the Buffett proposal is the best way to reduce the size of the U.S. trade deficit, but that is unimportant. What is important is that a Senator has laid on the table a bill that is intended to interfer with foreign trade with the objective of moving toward equal trade. No more allegiance to free trade. Acceptance of the goal of equal trade instead. That is a giant step forward.

Joseph WangNovember 12th, 2006 at 10:14 am

ReformerRay: Most of the net operating surplus is already allocated to pay back pre-existing loans and is thus unavailable for new investment. If you subtract that amount (which I think is about $2 trillion), you get back to the investment deficit.

bsetserNovember 12th, 2006 at 10:19 am

I need to read up on keynes’ international clearing union …

I do like the basic insight of Keynes that lay behind his initial vision of the imf — namely that adjustment requires symmetrical changes in both surplus and deficit countries (at least when the deficit countries are big enough to impact the global balance).

As for Buffet’s import certificate proposal, I tend to prefer exchange rate adjustment to various substitutes for exchange rate adjustment, such as auctioning off the right to import. So I would at least like to see exchange rate adjustment tried before heading off on alternative paths (import certificates, unilateral tariffs, etc) …

Ray — yep, we disagree. If you convert rising asset values into cash by selling the asset (or by borrowing against it), you create funds for new investment … and to a degree, that is what the US is doing. But the process of borrowing against the rising value of existing US external assets requires savings from the current income that the rest of the world is generating. Capital gains on existing assets are not the relevant metric for many purposes.

GuestNovember 12th, 2006 at 11:00 am

Ray – if only because financial services have become central to consuming, as so much is now purchased on credit.

If you have access to Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, interesting piece titled Value at Risk in the November 3rd issue.

GuestNovember 12th, 2006 at 11:28 am

last thought – on education and r&d spending, NACUBO’s 2005 survey of reporting North American institutions estimates the total value all endowments at $299 billion, Harvard well in the lead with over $25 billion. I haven’t seen anything that provides a combined estimate for total revenues from endowment investments along with public funds and tuition income. But interesting this significant, globalizing, growing sector doesn’t generate more commentary.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 12:22 pm

“Most of the net operating surplus is already allocated to pay back pre-existing loans and is thus unavailable for new investment. If you subtract that amount (which I think is about $2 trillion), you get back to the investment deficit”.

Why assume that preexisting loans MUST be paid back in one year? Second, the people that are in debt are not necessarily the people who profited from the Net Operating Surplus and the inflation of the stock market and home values.

I believe that the data on Personal Savings are accurate (-35 billion in 2005) and that the data on Net Operating Surplus are accurate (2.9 trillion). Personal Savings is a negative number because of the actions of those people who did not collect all the monies from profits and inflation of asset values.

The profits are real and the inflation of assets are real. And those monies are available to cover investment, if they are needed. However, they are not needed, because investment funds come from many different sources, some for equity investors, some from banks and insurance agencies and some from retained earnings.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 12:32 pm

Brad – I don’t understand why someone must sell a preexisting asset to generate funds for new investment. Can’t banks just loan money – create new money? Can’t businesses sell bonds to generate funds for investment? And the fat cats that have the “preexisting assets” buy those bonds, converting assets from one form to another without the intermediation of foreigners? Equity investors provide funds for investment in the U.S. without borrowing from abroad beause they have the assets and can convert them into whatever form is needed.

There must be some equation relating in and out flow of funds to the U.S. that I don’t understand – or perhaps more likely – refuse to believe.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 1:00 pm

Brad – our disagreement has more than one source – and my argument is with conventional wisdom, not just you.

I do not believe that the net gain of 585 billion dollars sent to the U.S. to create the Capital Account that matches the Current Account of 652 billion results in an increase in the total of financial assets owned in the U.S.

Accounting conventions require that the value of the flow overseas in each direction must be equal. Financial assets in some other form, bonds, equity, etc. must flow the other way to equal that 582 billion dollars sent to othe U.S.

Financial assets leave the U.S. early in the exchange process when dollars are sent overseas to pay for imports of goods and services in excess of exports. That is the only significant increase or decrease in financial assets in each nation in all the exchanges between nations. In the exchanges that create the Capital Account, the net financial assets in each country remain the same. They just change form.

Hence, I believe that U.S. consumers pay for the U.S. trade deficit by sending that first payment overseas. Contrary to the experience of poor nations, the U.S. does not borrow to pay for its trade deficit.

The Federal Government is selling Treasury bonds for reasons independent of the trade deficit. It is the fiscal deficit that is creating the debt of the Federal Government. The private sector is not in debt to pay for our excess imports.
Personal Savings is minus 35 billion because of our total purchases, as a nation, of which imports is around 18%.

I know I have developed a “off-beat” view of this matter, but it is the only view that I can square with my reading of the data.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 1:32 pm

More – Bernake’s conclusion that the developing countries are lending money to the developed world because they have a trade surplus is just wrong. Their trade surplus results in financial assets flow in to them to pay for their exports in excess of imports. They have the financial assets. Whether or not they choose to lend them to anyone else is a separate matter and does not depend upon the existence of the trade deficit of the U.S. What the trade deficit of the U.S. requires is that we send financial assets overseas to pay for our imports in excess of our exports. And it is because of the ease of creating financial assets in the U.S. (the gain of 3.8 trillion in Net Worth in the year of 2005)that the U.S. has been able to sustain the trade deficit thus far while maintianing a growing value of the dollar (from 1994 to 2005).

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 1:53 pm

More – The expectation (or perhaps hope)that foreigners will become saturated with dollars and start to sell dollars ignores the possibility that our tradimg partners are routinely adjusting the volume of dollars held as cash to suit their preferences. Others are willing to buy dollars from them because the purchaser expects to get in on the process that created a net worth addition of 3.8 trillion last year.

All this may change. The Net Worth in the U.S. did not increase in the second quarter of 2006. If Net Worth continues to stall, the value of the dollar should go down. But not necessarily immediately. In 2001, the dollar continued stubbornly to increase while the Net Worth plunged downward.

Look at the growth in values of foreign stock markets compared to U.S. stock markets for predictions of the future of the value of the U.S. dollars – with lags. Why the lags I don’t understand.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 1:53 pm

More – The expectation (or perhaps hope)that foreigners will become saturated with dollars and start to sell dollars ignores the possibility that our tradimg partners are routinely adjusting the volume of dollars held as cash to suit their preferences. Others are willing to buy dollars from them because the purchaser expects to get in on the process that created a net worth addition of 3.8 trillion last year.

All this may change. The Net Worth in the U.S. did not increase in the second quarter of 2006. If Net Worth continues to stall, the value of the dollar should go down. But not necessarily immediately. In 2001, the dollar continued stubbornly to increase while the Net Worth plunged downward.

Look at the growth in values of foreign stock markets compared to U.S. stock markets for predictions of the future of the value of the U.S. dollars – with lags. Why the lags I don’t understand.

gilliesNovember 12th, 2006 at 3:10 pm

from outside of the u s rightly or wrongly the recent election result seems to mark a retreat from unilateralist policies to more traditional multilateralism. it is difficult to see the retreat of u s unilateralism in the geopolitical sphere wthout wondering if something similar and parallel cannot and should not happen in the global financial sphere.
a number of questions seem to beg for attention -
1. should those countries who hold actual reserves have a vote/an input into the management of the reserve currency ? should a reserve fiat currency be brought into existence in a way that promotes the common good of the global financial community ?
2. would greater transparency in central banks’ and offshore banks’ business be a safeguard against financial crises and promote global financial stability ?
3. should there be a ban on financial products deliberately designed to be so complex as to defy investigation/imitation ?
4. should a limit be set on the proportion of speculative to ‘genuine’ trades permitted in any particular market ?
5. should cumulative personal borrowing be regulated with an upper limit in terms of percentage of total income available for the making of the repayments ?
5. should countries settle up their bills at the end of each month like everybody else ?
i feel that where so many transactions are both secret and speculative – it is little wonder that the future of the global economy is one of the great known unknowns . . . .

gilliesNovember 12th, 2006 at 3:33 pm

i feel that the model of global finances in most economists’ heads is still in terms of equations. the financial flows of the global community are in effect circular, like the gulf stream and the deep ocean currents – thus for example, a rise in the price of oil sucks more dollars out of the united states. but get the full picture and the extra money spent by the japanese and europeans on oil, goes to the oil producers, and then a high proportion of their oil expenditure (and that of the u s itself) gets deposited and invested back in the u s.
thus in the wider picture, the higher oil price feeds more dollars into the u s than it sucks out ? ? the more dollars leave the u s, the more dollars re-enter.
i suspect that the central banks are aware of the significance of the global financial flows. private, selfish, offshore speculators are the greater danger to the system than any central bank.

gilliesNovember 12th, 2006 at 3:41 pm

just to add this : that i am mailing from ireland. for those whose mental picture of ireland needs updating, we are now richer per capita than the united states, and we have that latest international status symbol – a property bubble.
by joining the euro we gained financial stability, but lost the freedom to raise interest rates to ‘cool’ the property market or effect other adjustments.
most commentators who foresee the dollar falling under stress, are forgetting that under stress the euro can also fall apart into divergent national currencies.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 6:50 pm

He says; she says. The trade deficit requires that the U.S. transfer financial assets to foreign countries. Alternative perspective –The trade deficit requires that the U.S. sell a debt instrument to foreign countries.

Only difference – intergenerational transfer consists of 1) less financial assets inherited or 2) debt inherited.

Less financial assets better because the same generation that reduced total financial assets by a trade deficit also created new financial assets at the same time. A debt can become onerous; less financial assets is merely a reality to be lived with.

GuestNovember 12th, 2006 at 6:57 pm

Beijing continues to finance America’s spending binge by lending it billions
http://torsun.canoe.ca/News/Columnists/Margolis_Eric/2006/11/12/pf-2326507.html

China’s mammoth trade surplus, and a rising flood of foreign investment, has swamped the nation’s banks with cash.

This, in turn, has fueled indiscriminate speculative investments, particularly in real estate, and a gold-rush frenzy that often obscures China’s solid economic development.

This flood of hot money poses a serious danger. Indiscriminate investment leads to overproduction, which then causes a deflationary crisis that could end in financial meltdown. Japan experienced similar phenomena in the 1990s.

China’s government has been struggling without much success to restrain this investment dragon. Beijing refuses, however, to allow its controlled, seriously undervalued currency, the yuan, to float, as its trade partners demand.

The undervalued yuan has given China its huge surplus, the motor of growth that has pulled the nation out of poverty. China still needs to deal with hundreds of millions of struggling farmers, state industry workers, and unemployed. So it refuses to allow the yuan to inch up by more than 5%.

If the yuan were allowed to float, say Chinese bankers, people would rush to convert to dollars, causing a dire financial crisis.

Too much cash

Anyway, argue Chinese officials, why should China pay the price for America’s profligacy in refusing to save and running huge government deficits by revaluing the yuan? The U.S. Treasury is printing too much money in order to keep America’s debt-ridden economy growing.

Since 60% of all U.S. dollars end up abroad, the Bush administration’s reckless spending and over-stimulative money policies have caused a dangerous world-wide cash flood and serious imbalances to the global economy.

U.S. Republicans would do well to take pointers on capitalism from China’s Communists, who have beaten the Western devils at their own game.

ReformerRayNovember 12th, 2006 at 7:39 pm

From a selfish point of view, why should the U.S. be unhappy if the Chinese economy follows the Japanese example? If I remember, there was a collective sigh of relief when the Japanese economy ceased growing so rapidly.

Your last sentence is closer to my feelings, that the Chinese Communists have beaten the Western devils at their own game.

I do not agree with your prediction that China may follow the example of Japan. Many differences, including Japan leadership aware of the problem you state and the willingness of the leadership to use their power to whip other elements, such as banks, into a shape that the leadership approves.

The Chinese are good at manufacturing goods for export. That is where they have beaten the U.S. at their own game. But obviously, where we are did not have to be. Germany and Japan have found a way to co-exist with China. We have not. Mainly because we were not willing to change our habits to deal with the existence of Chinese manufacturing goods.

bsetserNovember 12th, 2006 at 8:19 pm

Gillies — yes, mental images of Ireland need to be updated. Among other things, it is no longer a source of outward migrants to the US, but rather a destination for eastern europeans … And it has a bigger housing boom than the US. I have a guest post coming on the housing-centric Irish economy!

It is also a tax haven par excellence for US firms.

I haven’t been to Ireland since 96, and I suspect i wouldn’t recognize it.

I largely agree with you on the impact of oil. Higher oil prices have generated bigger surpluses in the oil economies — in part b/c of more $ from their exports to Asia. And those $ have gotten recycled into US dollar assets — fueling those parts of the US economy that are already strong. But in some sense the shocking thing is that Asia is both paying more its middle eastern oil and saving more — so there is more demand for dollars out of asia and the middle east at the same time.

Europe has managed higher oil prices surprisingly well, incidentally. in part b/c of a strong euro (which helps limit the euro increase in oil). and in part b/c of strong oil country demand for european products.

GheorghiusNovember 12th, 2006 at 8:29 pm

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a7mSK5HyfiQc&refer=home

BOOOOMM! A metaphoric nuclear bomb on those who believe that Central Banks’ direct intervention has a major, overwhelming role in keeping the dollar low against the Yen, Euro, Pounds and SSFF.

CBs have been selling the dollar for about a month now (Russia since more), but the dollar started to decline only a few days ago, when rumours of CBs’ dollar sales started to spread. Implication: net of rumours, the private sector was still willing to provide more flows (or at least enough flows) into the dollar than it is necessary to cover US Current account needs: when the dollar was falling from 1,25 to 1.28 against the Euro, it was the private sector who was buying!

Now: the dollar is at 117:57 Yen and 127:70 Euro at the time of writing this post. Now it will accelerate its depreciation and break the old trading range: of course! Fundamentals have turned against the dollar (interest rates starting to converge across OECD countries) + CBs are speaking against the dollar . All this = dollar down.

This, in my interpretation, is rather a proof that the dollar was not badly priced until this summer (before a battery of macro news came out all against the dollar), and that the private sector was behind CBs in keeping the dollar “high”.

Now the last proof that our view was right will be the hardest: a coming wave of dollar depreciation that (a) will not cause a bond collapse in the US, and (b) that will not overshoot: the coming wave of depreciation will be about 10-12%, not 30%, not dramatic): it will be only a “jump” on its new equilibrium path after fundamentals have changed. But the latter is of course uncertain… currencies do overshoot sometimes!

Have fun, dollar shorts!

bsetserNovember 12th, 2006 at 10:03 pm

“CBs have been selling the dollar for about a month now” …

Frankly, how do you know?

I follow this stuff pretty closely, and am very aware that there are large gaps in the data and the data doesn’t always tell a consistent story. The COFER data shows huge demand for pounds in the first half of 06, the BIS central bank deposits data shows enormous pound demand in 2005 and a fall of in 2006 .. there are ways to reconcile the data (both have gaps) but, well, it is hard to get a consistent picture. There are enormous gaps in the data, and the high quality data only comes with a lag.

We have some anecdotal evidence that some folks are now buying more yen — but that seems to be a recent trend. It certainly isn’t one that shows up in the available data for h1 2006. And it is hard to judge magnitudes/ evaluate whether folks are selling to dollars to buy yen or selling euros to buy yen (euro/ yen looks very out of line). I do think there has been an uptick in yen demand recnetly, but it strikes me that it is likely small relative to the ongoing buildup of reserves/ ongoing flows into euros/ dollars. but going from close to zero (h1) to something well above zero (right now) seems to be impacting the market. I think that supports the argument that central banks matter.

DFNovember 12th, 2006 at 11:57 pm

Of course those institutions are needed. IT s self evident. It s also self evident that people are only asking for them now that boom years are done.
Think about it all the international institutions so far have favored free trade, little has been done recently to avoid financial booms on the global level, especially financial booms on the back of devaluation policies from emerging countries.

GheorghiusNovember 13th, 2006 at 6:55 am

You’re right in pointing out that evidence is anecdotic; and also that data do not yet show such a trend, as they come in with a great delay. But the recent anecdotic evidence is not just about Yen buying, it’s also about diversifying away from dollars. And when the evidence is CBs speech, I tend to trust it. For it wouldn’t make sense for them to cheat us against the $… what, do you think theyre talking the dollar down? That would contradict your own theories about CBs trying to defend the dollar’s value against main currencies in order to protect the relative value of their large $ reserves. I don’t buy this theory, but neither the opposite. I think CBs are not trying to manipulate the major dollar crosses. So if they leak that they’re diversifying away from dollars I trust the news. So my point is: it’s pretty recent, ok, still the dollar is resilient and remains within its trading ranges.

The last of your point is “it is hard to judge magnitudes” . Of course. But diversifying away means that the net effect of these CB moves, however small, is at least not supportive of the dollar, implying that someone else is on the other side of dollar gross sales in currency mkts. It could be other CBs (OPEC) or private participants, but I doubt that OPEC CBs at this stage are increasing their dollar shares. We will see when the “high quality data” come in for 2006:Q4.

You follow these things more closely than I do. But I tried to provoke a comment of yours, not on the first half of 2006 but on the Oct/Nov. 2006 anecdotic evidence, and on these recent CB leaks about undergoing changes in the currency composition of their official reserves.

GheorghiusNovember 13th, 2006 at 8:09 am

PS – On the Yen: we’d have to check whether the Yen started to recover (a) not right when the CB Yen buying started, but rather a few (couple) of weeks later, when the leak about the CB buying came out (this would be Gheorghius-supportive), or (b) immediately when CBs started to buy (this would be Setser-supportive). Frankly, I’m not sure.

Yes, CBs matter, in many ways. Policy matters a lot. On major $ crosses, I feel CBs direct intervention in forex mkts (only part of their influence) matters for their turnover share, as the private sector matters for its turnover share. We’re not that far away…

Mike MandelNovember 13th, 2006 at 10:20 am

I did not explicitly come out in favor of global financial institutions. But capitalist financial markets, almost by definition, have a very strong positive feedback loop. When a market starts to turn seriously sour, investors rush to be the first ones out the door. In the worst case, this sort of crisis is not self-repairing, but requires a strong regulatory agency that can both ensure liquidity and close down bankrupt financial institutions.

Currently there is no regulatory agency that can perform this function on a global basis. That leave open the possibility of a global financial crisis that cannot be handled by national institutions. That’s really what everyone is scared of.

In fact, the main objection to the U.S. trade deficit is that it makes it harder for the U.S. to perform this function of global lender of last resort. But the fact is, the U.S. can no longer do it in any case.

bsetserNovember 13th, 2006 at 10:57 am

Michael — apologies if i overstated your argument. I was struck by this passage:

“Finally, a Big Big Idea–probably too big to even consider right now–would be the creation of global institutions for governing the world economy. History tells us that market economies are prone to financial crises, to which the only solution is a strong central bank. During the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, for example, the Fed played that role.

But with the explosive growth of China and India, that sort of role for the Fed is no longer feasible, and no new institution has arisen to take its place. As former Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, now a top official at Citigroup, recently said: “There’s no policy mechanism for bringing together the countries that really matter in the global economy.” The best solution would be some sort of global central bank with real powers–but that’s not going to happen until there’s a big enough financial crisis to truly scare people.”

GuestNovember 13th, 2006 at 12:17 pm

I think the notion of a global central bank is a no-starter. The problem is it puts control of the world economy into the hands of the same elite group that has advocated globalization and allowed first world workers (voters) to take the hit. This elite will never have the political credibility to do this because they have not delivered income or economic security to the voters of the developed world. In addition the notion is of course an anti-democratic idea and its time is past, the tide has turned.

gilliesNovember 13th, 2006 at 3:22 pm

“Finally, a Big Big Idea–probably too big to even consider right now–would be the creation of global institutions for governing the world economy.”

a week or two ago – ‘lets talk to iran and syria, and ask them nicely to help us pack up and leave without too much fuss . . . .” – would have been a ‘big idea.’

as with iraq – the turning point may be psychological rather than driven by events. the fragility of the global economy is in the back of all our minds. one day it will be in the forefront of our minds. tipping points are mysterious. one day it is 51%/49% and the next day you wake up and it has tipped over to 49%/51%. predicting or naming the 50/50 point is neither possible nor useful. a guy stepped off the back rail of the titanic as it slid under. he didn’t even get his hair wet. what looks like shrewd calculation is often unbelievable luck. most lotteries have that winning ticket in the drum somewhere.

Most Read | Featured | Popular

Blogger Spotlight

Ed Dolan Ed Dolan's Econ Blog

Edwin G. Dolan is an economist and educator with a Ph.D. from Yale University. Early in his career, he was a member of the economics faculty at Dartmouth College, the University of Chicago, and George Mason University. From 1990 to 2001, he taught in Moscow, Russia, where he and his wife founded the American Institute of Business and Economics (AIBEc), an independent, not-for-profit MBA program. Since 2001, he has taught at several universities in Europe, including Central European University in Budapest, the University of Economics in Prague, and the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, where he has an ongoing annual visiting appointment. During breaks in his teaching career, he worked in Washington, D.C. as an economist for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and as a regulatory analyst for the Interstate Commerce Commission, and later served a stint in Almaty as an adviser to the National Bank of Kazakhstan. When not lecturing abroad, he makes his home in San Juan Islands, Washington.

Economics Blog Aggregator

Our favorite economics blogs aggregated.